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STRIKES, PICKETING AND JOB ACTIONS
BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
CHARLES C. MULCAHY* AND STEVEN H. SCHWEPPE**
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a growth in militancy among public
employee unions. This militancy has been reflected in an in-
creased willingness to pursue various job actions, including
slow downs, refusal to work overtime, picketing and strikes,
when union demands are not resolved. Public employers faced
with these tactics for the first time are often surprised and
unable to cope with the situation. This problem arises at a time
when many municipal employers are faced with genuine
budget problems. Even where municipal budget problems are
not acute, municipal management often becomes enmeshed in
political processes that are incompatable with efficiency of op-
eration. When municipal managers attempt to strengthen op-
erational efficiencies, problems develop frequently with public
employees who are unwilling to accept change.' Necessary in-
creased productivity changes must be implemented, but mu-
nicipal management must also be prepared to face the conse-
quences.
Public employers must educate themselves concerning the
type of job actions, pressure tactics and other tools which a
public employee union may use against them. An awareness of
potential problems and potential remedies will go far in insur-
ing the municipal employer a safe and reasonable settlement
of the dispute. This article will attempt to summarize some of
the pressure tactics used by public employees and their unions
and outline some of the remedies available to the municipal
employer.
* B.S. 1959, Marquette University; J.D. 1962, Marquette University; member of
the law firm of Mulcahy & Wherry, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin; member of the
American, Wisconsin and Milwaukee Bar Associations. Mr. Mulcahy has been a fre-
quent contributor to the MARQUE=rE LAW REvIEw in the past.
** B.A. 1970, North Central College; J.D. 1974, University of Wisconsin Law
School; member of the law firm of Mulcahy & Wherry, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
member of the American, Wisconsin and Marathon County Bar Associations.
1. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(4)L (1973).
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A. Picketing
Picketing is a well established tool for influencing govern-
ment decisions by arousing public awareness and concern. It is
also a well established union pressure tactic. Public employee
unions will use picketing both to arouse public sympathy and
to support a strike or job action.
Informational picketing is designed to draw public atten-
tion to a dispute or complaint. A public employee union will
use this type of picketing for a wide variety of goals, many of
which have little or nothing to do with collective bargaining.
Government decisions regarding the budget, lay-offs, work
assignments, equipment purchases and a wide range of other
actions may draw informational pickets. Since government
buildings are frequently located near major roads and commer-
cial areas, such picketing will attract the attention of many
citizens as well as the media. Private sector unions may also
join in the picketing and picketing may be accompanied by
person-to-person contact with the electorate. Unless the public
employer is prepared to meet the questions raised by the pick-
ets with sound explanations and a thorough plan to attract the
public's attention, the interest drawn by informational picket-
ing can result in heavy public pressures to concede.
Where informational picketing alone is unsuccessful in
drawing the attention and political pressure desired by the
union, a sit-in or other exercise of civil disobedience may be
employed. Again, the objective will be to draw a maximum
amount of media coverage and public interest. The union's
chief objectives will be to spread its message to the electorate
and create political tensions within the ranks of elected offi-
cials.
Frequently, informational picketing is combined with some
type of job action. Large-scale picketing is often associated
with a full-scale walk-out. In many instances, pickets may be
the employer's only advance notice that a strike will occur.
Slow-downs, sabotage and other disruptive tactics may be
combined with picketing in efforts to apply even greater pres-
sure upon the public official. Even where picketing remains
informational only, discipline and production problems may
arise. The distraction of the pickets may limit the productivity
of other public employees and may cause an increase in absen-
teeism. Morale within the department will drop, and time may
be lost in discussions and arguments. The public employer
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must be prepared to meet these side effects from informational
picketing with disciplinary measures when required.
1. Limiting the Scope of Picketing
Any discussion of peaceful picketing and the law must
begin with the premise that "peaceful" picketing carried on in
a location generally open to the public is, absent other factors
involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected by
the First Amendment. 2 It is well established that peaceful pick-
eting has elements of speech connected with it and, therefore,
carries with it some First and Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tions.' In public sector labor disputes, the First Amendment
rights of assembly and speech are joined by the right to petition
elected officials.
Picketing, however, carries with it elements of conduct and,
as such, is subject to stricter regulations than pure speech.4 In
this regard, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
[.. IT]his Court has noted that picketing involved ele-
ments of both speech and conduct, i.e., patrolling and has
indicated that because of this intermingling of protected and
unprotected elements, picketing can be subject to controls
that would not be constitutionally permissable in the case of
'pure speech'.'
Among the controls which governments can impose on picket-
ing are restrictions on its subject and location.
Numerous courts have ruled that peaceful picketing by
public employees in support of an illegal strike is illegal picket-
ing and enjoinable 6 These courts have based their rulings on a
2. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local No. 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
3. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941);
Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); City of Wauwatosa v. King,
49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1970).
4. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local No. 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968); International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 695, AFL v. Voght,
Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Bakery
Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
5. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local No. 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 313 (1968).
6. University of Wisconsin v. The Teaching Assistants Association, Civil No. 130-
095 (Dane County Circuit Court - 1970), 74 LRRM 2052; Board of Education v. Red-
ding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); Kulish v. Policemen's Benevolent Associa-
tion, N.J. Superior Court Chancery Division, (Union County No. C-3444-72, 1973), 84
LRRM 2143; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council,
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series of United States Supreme Court decisions holding that
governments can legitimately prohibit picketing which is in
furtherance of illegal objectives. 7 In summarizing its decisions,
the United States Supreme Court stated:
This series of cases, then, established a broad field in
which a State, in enforcing some public policy, whether of its
criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by its legis-
lature or its courts, could constitutionally enjoin peaceful
picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy.'
In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.I union picketing to
force an employer to deal with only union peddlers was en-
joined by the Missouri Supreme Court on the grounds that the
objective of the picketing was an agreement in violation of state
anti-trust laws. In upholding the injunction, the United States
Supreme Court found that the basic question was whether the
state's statutorily established anti-trust regulation or the
union's demand for a monopoly would be obeyed by the com-
pany. The Court ruled that the state's power was preeminent,
even though the union's efforts at monopoly were inseparable
from any First Amendment protection for its picketing. Similar
reasoning was followed by the Court in Hughes v. Superior
Court,"° and Plumbers Union v. Graham."
In Building Services Union v. Gazzam, 2 a union's recogni-
tion picketing was enjoined by a state court on grounds that it
coerced the employer into signing a collective bargaining agree-
ment without allowing employees the statutory right to choose
their bargaining representative. In upholding the injunction,
the United States Supreme Court stated:
94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); Delaware River and Bay Authority v. Interna-
tional Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, 45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789 (1965);
City of Minot v. Drivers Union, 142 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 1966); State v. Heath, 117
N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1970); Trustees of California State College v. Local 1352 San Fran-
cisco State College Fed'n of Teachers, 13 Cal. App. 3d 863, 92 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1970);
City of Alcoa v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 203 Tenn. 12, 308
S.W.2d 476 (1957).
7. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 695, AFL v. Voght, Inc., 354
U.S. 284 (1957); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Building Services Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532
(1950); Plumbers Union v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
8. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 695, AFL v. Voght Inc., 354
U.S. 284, 293 (1957).
9. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
10. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
11. 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
12. 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
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An adequate basis for the instant decree is the unlawful
objective of the picketing, namely, coercion by the employer
of the employees' selection of a bargaining representative.
Peaceful picketing for any lawful purpose is not prohibited by
the decree under review."3
The application of these cases to public employee picketing
in support of a strike is clear. An important objective of picket-
ing is the discouraging effect it has on other employees who
may wish to cross picket lines. The coerciveness of the picket
line will cause employees to abandon their jobs and join the
strike. Thus, as in Giboney, the effects of such picketing will
be the growth of an activity-the public employee strike-
prohibited by statutory and common law. As discussed in
Gassam, such picketing is for an illegal purpose, the maintain-
ing of an illegal strike.
It is important to note that the right to enjoin public em-
ployees picketing is limited to picketing in support of an illegal
strike. Picketing which is solely informational could not be
enjoined in this manner.14 Such picketing would be less coer-
cive and would be more directly related to the right of speech,
assembly and petition. While such picketing is likely to create
serious political problems in the community, it would be en-
joinable only if the pickets created disruptions serious enough
to overcome First and Fourteenth Amendment protections
granted to speech, assembly and petition. 5
Where informational picketing occurs or where a complete
injunction is not desirable partial injunctive relief may be
available. Injunctive relief is constitutionally available to end
violent picketing or picketing which is part of a violent pattern
of events.16 Occasional acts of violence are not, however, suffi-
cient to justify an injunction.'7 Mass picketing which denies
ingress and egress from buildings is also subject to injunction."
In both cases of mass picketing and violence, the action en-
joined is conduct and not speech.
13. Id. at 539.
14. University of Wisconsin v. The Teaching Assistants Association, 74 LRRM 2052
(1970). Rockford v. Local 413 Firefighters, 98 Ill. App. 2d 36, 240 N.E.2d 705 (1968).
15. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
16. Milkwagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941);
Hotel & Restaurant Employees International Alliance v. WERB, 315 U.S. 432 (1942).
See also Youngdahl v. Rainfaire, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) and 48 Am. Jur. 2d § 1390.
17. Milkwagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
18. Hotel & Restaurant Employees International Alliance v. WERB, 315 U.S. 432
(1942). Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
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In other cases, criminal sanctions can be applied. Disor-
derly conduct and unlawful assembly statutes have been used
to restrict picketing.'9 Furthermore, under Wisconsin Statutes
section 134.03,11 persons threatening, intimidating, or coercing
other persons from working may be fined or imprisoned. Fi-
nally, where picketing occurs outside the context of collective
bargaining or union representation, it may be illegal under
Wisconsin Statutes section 103.535.
2. Limiting the Location of Picketing
Even if the public employer decides not to enjoin picketing
by public employees, it may need to restrict the location of
such picketing. The union may choose to picket homes, private
business, the city hall, or wherever it will receive attention and
create harassment. Picketing of residential areas can be pro-
hibited by narrowly drawn ordinances.2 1 In Wauwatosa v.
King,2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld such an ordi-
nance where school custodial, maintenance and cafeteria em-
ployees who were also public employees were picketing the
homes of school board members. In its decision, the supreme
court emphasized the right of the state to maintain the privacy
19. State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481, 265 N.W. 302 (1936); State v. Cooper, 205 Minn.
333, 288 N.W. 903 (1939).
20. Wis. STAT. § 134.03 (1973) provides:
Preventing pursuit of work. Any person who by threats, intimidation, force or
coercion of any kind shall hinder or prevent any other person from engaging in
or continuing in any lawful work or employment, either for himself or as a wage
worker, or who shall attempt to so hinder or prevent shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $100 or by imprisonment in the county jail not more than 6
months, or by both fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. Noth-
ing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit any person or persons off of
the premises of such lawful work or employment from recommending, advising
or persuading others by peaceful means to refrain from working at a place where
a strike or lockout is in progress.
21. Wis. STAT. § 103.535 (1973) provides:
Unlawful conduct in labor controversies. It shall be unlawful for anyone to
picket, or induce others to picket, the establishment, employes, supply or deliv-
ery vehicles, or customers of anyone engaged in business, or to interfere with his
business, or interfere with any person or persons desiring to transact or transact-
ing business with him, when no labor dispute, as defined in subsection (3) of
section 103.62, exists between such employer and his employes or their repre-
sentatives.
22. City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1970); City of
Brookfield v. Groppi, 50 Wis. 2d 166, 184 N.W.2d 96 (1970).
23. City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1970). See also
Appendix A, infra.
[Vol. 59
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
and tranquility of the home. Picketing of business establish-
ments unrelated to the labor dispute may also be enjoined. 4
Such picketing most commonly involves picketing of city coun-
cil, school board or county board members' businesses or places
of employment. The likely effects of such picketing will vary
from a near total boycott of the business in strong labor com-
munities to minor harassment of clients and customers. In any
case, this form of picketing will place direct economic and so-
cial pressures upon the elected official.
Picketing of publicly owned property may also be restricted
where valid reasons exist for the restriction. The need for quiet
in courthouse, hospital and library areas may justify such re-
strictions, 5 as may the need for security in and around jail-
houses.26 Ingress and egress to public buildings may be main-
tained by injunction. 7 Ordinances restricting picketing of pub-
lic buildings must, however, be narrowly drawn and must be
supported by substantial state interests.
3. Protection of Persons and Property
To avoid personal injuries and property damage as a result
of picketing, the public employer must establish a thorough
and detailed plan. This will require a complete briefing of law
enforcement and fire protection personnel to coordinate res-
ponsibilities. Among matters which should be discussed at this
briefing are:
1) Control of sabotage and vandalism;
2) Traffic safety in the area being picketed;
3) Arrest procedures;
4) Techniques to be used in maintaining ingress and
egress to public buildings.
Less experienced law enforcement personnel should be briefed
on arrest procedures and the necessity for remaining neutral on
the issues causing the picketing. Such personnel may also re-
quire briefing on the rights of pickets vis-a-vis the government
and general public.2"
24. Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritters Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Kulish v.
Policemen's Benevolent Association, 84 LRRM 2143 (1973).
25. Cox v. Louisiana, 37 U.S. 536 (1965); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111,
118 (1969) (concurring opinion).
26. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
27. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
28. For a more thorough discussion of law enforcement's role in public employee
1976]
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4. Public Relations
The public will expect answers to its questions as to what
caused the picketing. To meet the expectation, the employer
should be prepared to "sell" its position to the public. Unless
the employer seeks to publicize its position, the public will
receive only the information given- it by the union. This will
result in a misunderstanding of the issues and may lead public
opinion to the conclusion that management is acting irration-
ally or in bad faith. Once* public opinion rides with the union,
management will find itself under increasing pressure to settle,
regardless of the long term consequences. The labor dispute
will become a political football to be settled by political pres-
sures rather than by the give and take of negotiations.
Among the information which public employers often re-
lease to combat union publicity is data comparing the picket-
ing employees with other public and private employees, data
showing the real cost of the employees' wage demands and data
showing the effects of the union's demands on taxes and upon
the budget. The employer's presentation should be reduced to
the point where the difference between the parties is clear.
Issues which are not presented quickly and clearly to the public
will not be understood and may give rise to suspicions that the
employer is not seriously seeking an agreement.
Frequently, the employer's public information campaign is
carried out through press releases and interviews. Speeches
before civic organizations may be an equally effective tool. In
some cases, public employers have purchased ads in local
newspapers to insure that the issues are correctly presented
and emphasized. Public information campaigns can extend to
striking employees as well. While the employer must avoid
bargaining individually with employees, it is allowed to present
its offer to the employees and to inform them of differences
between the union's and employer's positions. The employer
should offer only that which has first been offered to and re-
jected by the union. A letter stating what the employer's last
offer is and the reasons for the offer will give employees a
clearer view of the differences between the union and employ-
er. Such letters should be drafted with great care since the
union will view them as a deliberate attempt to undermine its
strikes, see MOBERLY AND MULCAHY, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LABOR RELATIONS, (State Bar
of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 123-136.
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position and will be ready to challenge the letters in a prohib-
ited practice charge if improper overtures to employees are
made. Communications to employees may be especially valua-
ble where the continuance of the labor dispute is based upon
the union's unreasonable expectations.
B. Partial Strikes and Job Actions
Partial strikes and job actions often accompany informa-
tional picketing. In fact, such picketing often is an attempt to
highlight the existence of a partial strike. Substantial amounts
of pressure, either real or imagined, can be placed on a munici-
pal employer through the use of the partial strike or job action.
Partial strikes or job actions can be defined as purposeful refus-
als by employees to perform certain assigned tasks or to reach
the expected levels of productivity. These actions can create
serious operating difficulties. Partial strikes or job actions can
be divided into four classifications:
1) Slowdowns;
2) The "blue flue" syndrome;
3) The "quickie" strike;
4) Selective job actions such as refusal to perform as-
signed tasks.
1. Job Slowdowns
The job slowdown occurs when employees purposely fail to
maintain their productivity. In order to support their demands,
employees perform less work for the same pay. Examples of
slowdowns in the public sector are well illustrated in street and
highway departments. Refuse collectors may fail to complete
their garbage runs, thus allowing garbage to accumulate to
unpleasant and/or unsafe levels. Highway crews may slow
down repair or snow removal assignments, causing inconveni-
ence to motorists. Employees may perform work so poorly that
projects must be redone with resulting waste of material and
time.
Similar to the slowdown is the ticket writing "speedup"
campaign employed by law enforcement personnel. Suddenly
police or deputies will rigidly enforce selected laws. The em-
ployees deliberately fail to use discretion in the enforcement of
the law. Obsolete laws which have been ignored for years may
be vigorously enforced while more serious law enforcement
problems are ignored. Other violations such as jaywalking, lit-
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tering and minor traffic and speeding violations may be strictly
enforced.
The slowdown or speedup tactic offers several advantages
to the union. Most significant is that employees suffer no loss
of income. Regardless of their productivity, they continue to
receive their normal hourly rate of pay. Since employees en-
gaged in the slowdown suffer no economic consequences, wide
acceptance of and compliance with union strategy may be ex-
pected. In some instances, the slowdown may even increase
employee earnings; an unprepared employer may counter a
slowdown by ordering overtime work. Normally, an employer
should not pay a premium for work which should have been
done during normal working hours.
A slowdown such as occurs in highway and street depart-
ments requires no affirmative action by employees. Employees
are only asked to work slower and relax. Slowdown activities
are easily justified in the minds of the employees who fre-
quently feel that by slowing down they are providing only a
level of services commensurate with the level of wages offered
by the employer. Employees confronted with discipline for a
slowdown frequently design convincing justifications for their
conduct. Reports of equipment breakdown or material shor-
tages will increase as employees attempt to protect themselves
from possible disciplinary procedures.
2. "Blue Flu"
Like the slowdown, the "blue flu" tactic seeks to maximize
the harassment effect of the strike while limiting the economic
cost to the employee. The "blue flu" tactic involves the mas-
sive, organized use of sick leave by employees. Because they
utilize paid sick leave, employees do not lose wages. A primary
consequence of the "blue flu" tactic is a loss of management's
ability to direct the work force. The "blue flu" places pressure
upon the supervisory staff by making scheduling extremely dif-
ficult and unpredictable.
3. "Quickie" Strike
The "quickie" strike occurs when employees refuse, without
warning, to perform certain tasks. Employees may simply sit
down on the job, thus obstructing other employees. Union
meetings may be called during working hours or during impor-
tant rush periods. Each of these methods is aimed at making
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it impossible for the employer to properly manage the work
force and achieve production goals.
4. Selective Job Actions
The union may also call a selective strike in which employ-
ees on certain key jobs strike while others continue to perform
their customary non-essential work. Employees may refuse to
perform emergency work and may refuse to perform any work
except that work specially assigned them. Similarly, employees
may refuse to perform certain important parts of their work,
thus disrupting the employer's entire program. In other cases,
only those employees with specific essential skills will strike.
In the school area, for example, the union may choose to strike
only with its shop teachers or a similar group of specialized
personnel. Because such personnel are not easily repleaced on
short notice, the employer's entire educational program is dis-
rupted with minimum economic consequence to the union. The
unpredictability of a selective job action makes it particularly
difficult to control. The cost of replacement and overtime will,
as in other forms of partial strikes, be substantial.
An especially serious form of selective job action is sabo-
tage. Sabotage may consist of either the distruction of the em-
ployer's property or the misuse of property. Employees may fail
to maintain their equipment, thus causing damage to expen-
sive equipment. Parts may be removed from machinery mak-
ing it inoperable, and keys may be hidden. If equipment is left
unharmed, the work may be done so poorly that it is of little
value to the employer. A less wasteful but equally serious form
of sabotage occurs where, through the misuse of equipment,
employees avoid doing any work whatsoever. An example of
this may be found in the case of courthouse or social workers
who tie up phone lines thus making it impossible for clients to
receive services.
C. Full Scale Strikes
Of the variety of job actions, a full scale strike by public
employees poses the greatest threat to the public health, safety
and welfare. Its greater duration, pressure and threat to com-
munity harmony and safety require that the employer meet the
strike's problems correctly. As in the case of other job actions,
advance planning is essential. Such planning requires a knowl-
edge of the alternatives available to the employer at each stage
of the strike.
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The alternatives available to the employer run the gamut
from closing down operations to hiring permanent replace-
ments. Local conditions, the nature of the services, and the
impact on the community will serve as guidelines in choosing
one alternative over the others.
D. The Response of Public Management
Public management must be prepared to cope with strikes,
picketing and job actions by public employees. Each of the
potential problem areas must be evaluated and specific plans
formulated to insure continuation of public services.
1. Reaction to the Partial Strike
Partial strikes are aimed at pressuring the supervisory staff,
the public employer and the public in general. To be success-
ful, a partial strike must be disruptive enough to draw public
attention or cripple essential services. Any plan to meet the
partial strike must be aimed at reducing this harassment and
maintaining essential services at the highest possible level.
Planning is essential in meeting partial strikes. In the event of
slowdowns, "blue flu" or refusals to perform assigned tasks,
scheduling is an especially important management tool. Man-
agement should review the services performed and decide
which services are essential. Essential services should be sched-
uled so as to allow adequate time and personnel for their com-
pletion. Items with less priority will need to be postponed until
a full staff is available or until essential tasks have been com-
pleted.
During any job action, the employer should employ the
same disciplinary actions which would be employed under nor-
mal working conditions. Under normal circumstances, most
employers have means for handling excessive absenteeism,
abuse of sick leave or failure to meet production goals. When a
job action occurs during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement, a comprehensive no-strike clause in the agreement
will provide additional and more reliable grounds for disci-
pline. No-strike clauses may specifically prohibit refusals to
work overtime, refusals to cross picket lines, slowdowns or mass
sick leaves."9 Frequently, a no-strike clause is the quid pro quo
29. fllustrative of a thorough no-strike clause is the following:
Strike Prohibited. Neither the Union nor any officers, agents or employees will
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for a grievance and arbitration procedure. With the right to
have grievances arbitrated, the legitimate need for job actions
during the term of the agreement is eliminated. Arbitration
insures employees that their complaints will be heard and de-
termined by their merits. Although public sector strikes may
be illegal, a no-strike clause remains valuable in deterring job
actions and in forewarning employees that such tactics are
unquestionably in violation of the contract.
The fact that absenteeism and poor workmanship is spon-
sored by the union should not affect the employer's use of pro-
gressive discipline. Written reprimands, suspension and finally
termination for violations of work rules and standards remain
valid disciplinary methods. The need for effective work rules is
especially apparent in the case of sabotage. Without rules spe-
cifically prohibiting potentially harassing conduct, an em-
ployee may defeat disciplinary actions by claiming ignorance.
Work rules should include specific requirements as to mainte-
nance and job performance which can be used against job ac-
tions designed at waste and equipment misuse. Where work
rules are inadequate to meet a job action, the employer may
be required to issue new rules and to properly notify all employ-
ees of the additional requirements.
An employer using disciplinary procedures to meet the par-
tial strike must be careful to avoid discrimination based upon
union membership. Discipline must be uniformly applied to
both the hostile union leadership and to the less involved em-
ployee. Finally, work rules must be known by the employees.
The employer should not begin to impose heavy penalties for
activities it has always tolerated or ignored. Sudden and ex-
treme changes in work rules and their enforcement may expose
the employer to a prohibited practice charge for interferring
with the union's right to bargain collectively." If discipline is
calmly and rationally imposed, however, the public employer's
decision to discipline will either cause employees to end the
partial strike or face temporary or permanent loss of income.
It must be remembered that discipline is only one means of
instigate, promote, encourage, sponsor, engage in or condone any strike, picket-
ing, slowdown, refusal to work overtime, concerted work stoppage or any other
intentional interruption of work during the term of this Agreement.
No-strike clauses may also include specific penalties or damages to be imposed
upon the striking union.
30. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(3)(a) (1973).
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ending the partial strike and achieving a settlement. Where it
will not achieve those ends, alternatives should be considered.
In some cases, discipline may be counterproductive by creating
a new and different issue for collective bargaining-amnesty
for disciplined employees. At that point, the employer may be
caught in the dilemma of either weakening the future deterr-
ment effect of discipline by giving amnesty or of rejecting an
otherwise acceptable settlement offer containing amnesty.
As an alternative to disciplinary actions, public employers
can meet the job action by retaining private contractors or by
locking out employees. The use of private contractors to finish
projects not completed by public employees adds expense but
insures that essential projects will be finished and finished cor-
rectly. In serious cases of partial strikes, the effectiveness of the
public employer's operations may be so reduced that no useful
work is being completed. In such cases, a lockout will put the
economic burden of a strike on the employees. A lockout may,
however, cause the public to place blame on the employer for
the inconvenience of the strike-lockout and for the failure to
reach a settlement.
2. Legal Remedies to Partial Strikes
In the private sector, employers have been upheld for taking
disciplinary measures, including discharge, against employees
engaged in slowdowns or partial strikes." It is generally held
that employees have no right to continue working on their own
terms while rejecting the employer's quality and productivity
standards. This rationale has supported discharges of employ-
ees engaged in job slowdowns. In the private sector, even selec-
tive discharges designed to provide an example to employees
engaged in slowdowns have been upheld so long as no discrimi-
natory motive exists." Private sector decisions have also held
that "quickie" strikes and refusals to perform overtime assign-
ments may be grounds for discipline and discharge." The gen-
eral rationale behind these cases is that employees cannot pen-
31. Elk Lumber Co., 91 NLRB 333, 25 LRRM 1493 (1950); Raleigh Water Heater
Mfg. Co., 136 NLRB 76, 49 LRRM 1708 (1962).
32. California Cotton Cooperative Assn., 110 NLRB 1494, 35 LRRM 1390 (1954).
33. Scott Lumber Co., Inc., 117 NLRB 1790, 40 LRRM 1086; Honolulu Rapid
Transit Co., 110 NLRB 1806, 35 LRRM 1305 (1954); Valley City Furniture Co., 110
NLRB 1589, 35 LRRM 1265 (1954), enforced 230 F.2d 947, 36 LRRM 2740 (6th Cir.
1956); Pacific Telephone and Telegraph, 107 NLRB 1547, 33 LRRM 1433 (1954).
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alize their employer by strike tactics while maintaining their
pay status.
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission has
held that partial strikes are not protected activities under Wis-
consin Statutes section 111.70(3)" 4 and employees engaged in
them are not immune from discipline. In Kenosha Education
Association,35 the commissioner discussed the partial strike
and adopted the reasoning that a partial strike was an unpro-
tected attempt by employees to unilaterally set wages and con-
ditions of employment. The commission asserted that even in
the event of a prohibitied practice by the employer, a partial
strike would not be protected.
The Kenosha case dealt with an open house and promo-
tional program annually conducted by teachers. The labor
agreement between the board and teachers did not, however,
include the program among the extra-curricular activities of a
teacher. Relying on past practices, the commission held that it
was mutually accepted that participation in the open house
was not purely voluntary and therefore the concerted refusal to
participate was a strike as much as any strike that occurs when
there is no labor agreement in effect. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the commission drew a clear distinction between volun-
tary and required activities, indicating that a refusal to partici-
pate in strictly voluntary activities would be protected activ-
ity.3 6
In the case of DeForest Area School District No. 10,11 the
commission indicated that the "quickie" strike might also be
unprotected activity. The teacher involved in the case left the
school to attend a teachers' association convention. In his de-
fense, the teacher cited alleged prohibited practices committed
by the employer and claimed his conduct was in protest of
those actions. The commission found that the teacher could be
disciplined.
While a partial strike may not be protected activity, the
union may file prohibited practices charges against the public
employer who used discipline in such instances. The grounds
for such charges would be interference with union collective
34. Wis. STAT. § 111.70(3) (1973).
35. Kenosha Education Assoc., WERC Dec. No. 10752-A (10/72).
36. See Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services of Correction, WERC
Dec. No. 8892.
37. DeForest Area School District No. 10, WERC Dec. No. 11492 (12/73).
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bargaining tactics or discrimination against union members. It
would appear from the above cases that the commission would
be unlikely to find such a prohibited practice in the absence of
strong evidence that the discipline was for some reason other
than the partial strike. Where selective discipline has been
imposed and no attempt at progressive discipline has been
made, a charge of discrimination would appear to be much
stronger.
Besides the commission's procedures, employees disci-
plined for partial strikes may have contractual remedies. These
include the just cause standard for discipline. The contract's
arbitration procedures may also be available. Where a contract
is in effect, where the terms of the agreement have been ex-
tended pending agreement on a new contract, or where contract
terms are made retroactive, these remedies are available to the
disciplined employee. Where, however, the contract has ex-
pired and agreement on a grievance procedure has not been
reached, there exists case law to the effect that the employee
has no grievance rights. 8 Some authorities suggest that the
employer may be required to bargain with the union concerning
whatever disciplinary action is taken. 9 The need for a record
of progressive discipline, uniform enforcement of work rules,
and thorough written documentation of work rule violations
and well known work rules is necessary in arbitration.
While slowdowns and quickie strikes are unprotected under
Wisconsin Statutes section 111.70(2), Wisconsin case law indi-
cates that they may not be strikes for purposes of the strike
prohibition found in Wisconsin Statutues section
111.70(4)(1). In UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board,4 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a series of
quickie strikes was not a "strike" for purposes of Wisconsin
Statutes section 111.06(2) (h) .42 Under section 111.06(2) (h),
38. See ELKOURI AND ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS, (3rd Ed., 1973) pp. 66-67
and cases cited therein. United Parcel Service Inc., 55 LA 443 (Forsythe, 1970); Teams-
ters v. Kroger, 411 F.2d 1191 (3rd Cir. 1969). In Racine Education Association v.
United School District No. 1, WERC Dec. No. 11315-D (1-74) the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Commission stated in dictum that an employer was not obligated to
arbitrate a grievance arising during the period between expiration of the employer
contract and the effective date of the successor agreement.
39. Hilton-Davis Chemical Co., 185 NLRB 241, 75 LRRM 1036 (1970); Taft Broad-
casting Co., 185 NLRB 202, 75 LRRM 1076 (1970).
40. Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (1973).
41. 250 Wis. 550, 27 N.W.2d 875 (1947).
42. Wis. STAT. § 111.06(2)(h) (1973).
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employees were prohibited from interfering with production
"except by leaving the premises in an orderly manner for the
purpose of going on strike." The court turned to a definition of
strike found in Wisconsin Statutes section 103.43(1)(a) which
provided that a strike exists so long as "unemployment on the
part of the workers affected continues. ' 4 The court held that
in the event of a quickie strike, no unemployment resulted and
certainly no continuous unemployment. While in a future case
the court might accept a new definition of "strike" which
would include job actions, 44 the definition applied in the UAW
case may limit access to injunctive relief against partial strikes.
From a practical standpoint, this type of activity is completed
before injunctive relief can be obtained in the courts.
3. Discontinuing Services
The simplest alternative available to the employer is to
close down operations completely. This tactic will avoid some
of the conflict and hard feelings generated by stronger respon-
ses. Settlement may occur earlier if public pressure to resume
services forces concessions from the public employees. In some
situations, the employer has little choice but to use this strat-
egy. Where highly skilled or professional employees leave their
work, it may be impossible to use supervisors, private contrac-
tors or replacements. In other cases, supervisory personnel are
themselves unionized and will refuse to cooperate with the
employer. Unless the employer has a strong no-strike clause in
the supervisory unit contract, services will be terminated. Few
public services are, however, so unnecessary that they can be
discontinued indefinitely without serious consequences. Fur-
thermore, most strike issues are so important that manage-
ment cannot afford to surrender. If surrender is to be avoided,
management should maintain an active response to the strike.
4. Maintaining Essential Services
In many cases, the essential tasks performed by public
employees can be temporarily performed by supervisory per-
sonnel and non-striking employees. While much of the paper-
work and followup activities will be postponed, the essential
core of the operations can be continued in this manner. In
43. Wis. STAT. § 103.43(1)(a) (1973).
44. Oeflein v. State, 177 Wis. 394, 188 N.W. 633 (1922).
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social services departments, for example, supervisory staff with
the aid of a few cooperating employees can often handle the
benefit programs. While counseling and other worthwhile ac-
tivities may be postponed, the basic functions of the depart-
ment can be maintained. In some circumstances, the public
itself can, with a minimum of hardship, greatly lessen the bur-
den of a strike. Homeowners may be requested to carry garbage
to the street rather than placing it at the back door for pickup.
By making non-striking employees more productive, such min-
imal public efforts will lessen the strike's effects. At the strike's
end such temporary changes may become permanent and re-
sult in long term productivity gains. In more serious sanitation
strikes, it may be necessary to provide central dumping areas
or require citizens themselves to carry garbage to a landfill site.
Each of these alternatives will lessen the strike's effectiveness
by reducing the threat to public health and welfare.
Often a proportion of the employees in the bargaining unit
will cross the union's picket lines. Their efforts will release the
pressure on supervisory personnel and will broaden the range
of services that can be continued. By breaking ranks with the
union, these employees expose themselves to personal attacks
by union adherents. During the strike, extra precautions must
be taken to protect the employees' property, homes and fami-
lies. Where union picketers are violent, this protection may
extend to the provision of food and bedding at the job site.
After the strike, it may be necessary to separate these employ-
ees from the strikers so as to avoid harassment and confronta-
tion.
Special consideration must also be given to the wages and
benefits paid the non-striking employees. In the private sector
it is an unfair labor practice to offer non-striking employees
higher wages and benefits than offered striking employees."
After an impasse, the employer may make a final offer to the
union and begin to provide the benefits of that offer to all
returning employees." The offer must be the same offer made
to the union and must be made after an impasse has occurred.
While the WERC has not ruled on the question, the private
sector precedents make it conceivable that the WERC could
45. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
46. Alameda Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 729, 56 LRRM 2548 (1st Cir. 1964); Eddie's
Chop Shop, 165 NLRB 861, 65 LRRM 1408 (1967).
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find the employer to be bargaining in bad faith and discrimi-
nating if special benefits and wages were offered to returning
employees.
Special consideration must also be given to supervisory
staff. During the strike, they will be required to work long hours
under unpleasant and even dangerous conditions. They may be
called upon to perform bargaining unit work as well as some of
their regular management duties. Frequently, supervisory staff
do not receive overtime premiums. Thus, during a strike, they
may be living on the job site, working far more than eight hours
a day and yet not receiving any additional pay or benefits. The
effect of this condition on morale is obvious. Since high morale
among supervisory staff is essential to the success of the em-
ployer's plan, additional salaries and benefits should be consid-
ered. While supervisory staff wages, benefits and terms of em-
ployment should be renewed annually as a matter of course, a
strike may require special, temporary improvements for those
people.
Supervisory staff will need additional police protection for
themselves, their homes and their families. Like returning
employees, provisions may have to be made for food and rest
at the job site. In addition, extraordinary caution must be exer-
cised in the use of equipment. Many supervisory personnel may
be unfamiliar with the equipment they are assigned to use. The
equipment may be sabotaged or may suffer from lack of main-
tenance. During the strike, rigid safety precautions must be in
effect to avoid injury to the supervisors or the public.
The plans for continuing services should include not only
personnel problems which might arise but also material, insur-
ance and communications problems. Arrangements must be
made with suppliers to insure an adequate flow of material
through the picket lines. County contracts with suppliers and
others should be examined to determine whether the county
can fulfill the contracts or can use supplies already ordered.
Insurance policies should be examined to determine whether
they cover accident, injury or destruction due to a strike. Fi-
nally, a strike headquarters should be established. This head-
quarters will be invaluable in coordinating news releases, pro-
viding rapid policy decisions and in maintaining liaison with
all county officials. A strike committee consisting of the per-
sonnel director, police and fire chiefs, attorney, budget director
and chairmen of essential committees should be formed to op-
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erate the headquarters and to make rapid policy decisions for
the employers.
5. Contracting Out
Where supervisory staff and returning employees are not
numerous enough to complete essential tasks, private contrac-
tors may be used. In highway and street departments, this
tactic is especially useful. Many service stations and private
construction companies have equipment which can be used for
snow removal purposes. The owner or employee of the owner
will often operate the equipment. Aid from surrounding cities
and counties may also be an alternative. Special protection
should be provided for contractors since they are otherwise
vulnerable to sabotage, threats and vandalism. While this al-
ternative may be expensive, it allows the employer to meet
emergencies, such as a snow fall, with less inconvenience to the
public.
6. Injunctive Relief
The injunction is the most widely discussed method for
combating serious public employee strikes. Employers have
found that this method often provides quick relief and leaves
fewer after-effects than other alternatives. Since neither strikes
nor strike threats are prohibited practices under Wisconsin
Statutes section 111.70(3)(b)47 the employer's main legal
weapon for countering a strike is the injunction. Several factors
must be weighed, however, before a public employer decides to
seek injunctive relief. It must be realized that the injunction
will not settle the strike. The basic issues which caused the
strike will remain unsettled even after a successful injunction.
Ill will arising from the injunction proceedings and the injunc-
tion itself may make agreement on those issues more remote.
Furthermore, the union may be forced to respond to the injunc-
tion by maintaining a rigid position at the bargaining table. By
this means, it can save face with its members who may see the
injunction as breaking the strike and the union. Finally, pri-
vate sector unions may be motivated to actively support the
47. Wauwatosa School Board, WERC Dec. No. 8636 (7/68), Brown County WERC
Dec. No. 9537 (3/70). However, where a striking union coerces or restrains employee
rights, granted under Wis. STAT. § 111.70(2), it has committed a prohibited practice.
Union sponsored strikes which result in coercion of such employee rights would be
subject to a WERC injunction.
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strikers by their traditional opposition to strike injunctions.
The employer must also consider the effect of a denial of
injunctive relief. Injunctions are by no means automatic. In-
deed, it is common for the judge to order extensive bargaining
and mediation before permanent relief is granted. If, as a result
of this forced bargaining, a settlement is not reached, the em-
ployer cannot afford to lose the injunction. An unsuccessful
attempt to obtain an injunction will strengthen union morale.
Without the threat of an injunction, the union's bargaining
team can afford to take a more rigid position. Even if an injunc-
tion is granted, the court order must be enforced. 8 Striking
employees may refuse to obey the order and police may hesitate
to prosecute violations of the order. Even if the injunction is
vigorously enforced, the arrest of striking employees may
heighten community tensions.
Numerous court decisions have held that strikes by public
employees are illegal and may be enjoined." The rationale for
these decisions lies in the unique responsibilities of government
and government employees. Public employee strikes have been
seen as an attack upon governmental authority. In Norwalk
Teachers Assoc. v. Board of Education,0 the Connecticut Su-
preme Court stated:
In the American system, sovereignty is inherent in the
people. They can delegate it to a government which they
create and operate by law. They can give to that government
the power and authority to perform certain duties and furnish
certain services. A government so created and empowered
must employ people to carry on its task. Those people are
48. For background on the extent to which employees and unions can be fined and
contained, see Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 v. Kenosha Education Associa-
tion, 00 Wis.2d 000, 000 N.W.2d 000 (1975). For further background on the problem of
service of the order for temporary injunction, see Joint School District No. 1, Wisconsin
Rapids v. Wisconsin Rapids Education Association, 00 Wis.2d 000, 000 N.W.2d 000
(1975).
49. Board of Education of Martins Ferry City School Dist. v. Ohio Education
Assoc., 13 Ohio Misc. 308, 235 N.E.2d 538 (1967); Board of Education of City of New
York v. Shanker, 283 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. 1967), aff'd. 286 N.Y.S.2d 453; Pinellas
County Classroom Teachers Assoc. v. Board of Public Instruction, 214 So.2d 34 (Fla.
1968); Arizona Board of Regents v. Communications Workers of America, 661 CCH
Lab. Cas. No. 52159 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 1969); Anderson Federation of Teachers v. School
Dist. of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969) and cases cited therein. For a
more extensive discussion of this topic, see MOBERLY AND MULCAHY, PUBLIC EMPLOY-
MENT LABOR RELATIONS 103-22 (State Bar of Wisconsin, 1974).
50. 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
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agents of the government. They exercise some part of the
sovereignty entrusted to it. They occupy a status entirely
different from those who carry on a private enterprise. They
serve the public welfare and not a private purpose. To say
that they can strike is the equivalent of saying they can deny
the authority of government and contravene the public wel-
fare.5 '
Other courts have emphasized the danger of governmental
paralysis which is posed by public employee stikes. In Board
of Education of City of New York v. Shanker,52 the court in
granting an injunction against striking teachers quoted approv-
ingly from former Governor Dewey that:
Every liberty enjoyed in this Nation exists because it is pro-
tected by a government which functions uninterruptedly.
The paralysis of any portion of government could quickly lead
to the paralysis of all society. Paralysis of government is an-
archy and in anarchy, liberties become useless. 3
Public employee strikes have been enjoined merely on the
ground they are illegal. Under such precedents, no showing of
irreparable injury has been required. In University of Wiscon-
sin v. The Teaching Assistants Association,54 the court found
that although the university had made a sufficient showing of
irreparable injury, an injunction against striking teaching as-
sistants was proper based solely upon their illegal strike. The
decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in International
Union UA WF of L. Local 232 v. WERB,55 appeared to support
this position. The court stated:
If a conspiracy to do a criminal act can be enjoined, so may
a conspiracy to do an illegal act not criminal. All that is
essential to support injunctional relief is unlawfulness. 6
In a recent decision, however, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that public employee strikes should not be enjoined
solely on the basis of their illegality. In Joint School District
51. Id. at -, 83 A.2d at 485.
52. 283 N.Y.S.2d 548, 66 LRRM 2308 (1967).
53. Id. at 552-53, 66 LRRM 2314. See also Anderson Federation of Teachers v.
School Dist. of Anderson, 250 Wis. 550, 27 N.W.2d 875 (1947).
54. University of Wisconsin v. The Teaching Assistants Association, Civil No. 130-
095 (Dane County Circuit Court-1970), 74 LRRM 2052.
55. 250 Wis. 550, 27 N.W.2d 875 (1945).
56. Id. at 563, 27 N.W.2d at 881. See also UAW Local 806 v. WERB, 250 Wis. 570,
27 N.W.2d 885 (1946).
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No. 1, Wisconsin Rapids v. Wisconsin Rapids Education
Association,"7 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that under
the statutory authority for the issuance of temporary injunc-
tion:5"
The key prerequisite to injunctive relief-irreparable
harm-remains, and a court should not restrain illegal acts
merely because they are illegal unless the injury sought to be
avoided is actually threatened or has occurred."
The court's decision in the Wisconsin Rapids case is based
upon its finding that injunctive relief should be a last resort in
settling a public sector labor dispute. The granting of injunc-
tive relief based solely on the illegality of a public employees'
strike would, the court indicated, make injunctions too simple
a remedy for the public employer. Easily available injunctive
relief, the court felt, would also restrict the effectiveness of
mediation and fact finding set forth in Wisconsin Statutes sec-
tion 111.70(4)(c) and could cause continuing ill will to develop
between the employer and employees.
The Wisconsin Rapids decision will require public employ-
ers to show in many cases that the illegal strike has caused
irreparable harm or that such irreparable harm is imminent or
threatened. Whether or not the employer has met this burden
will be determined by the trial court and will not be upset
unless an abuse of discretion is shown. The test for abuse of
discretion which the court applied in the Wisconsin Rapids
case is that contained in McCleary v. State."° In the McCleary
decision it also found that an abuse of discretion could occur
when:
1. The trial judge fails to consider factors relevant to
a decision;
2. The trial judge considers irrelevant or improper
facts in reaching a decision;
3. The trial judge places too much weight on one fac-
tor in reaching a decision.
The relevant factors and weights to be given each factor must
be determined by the circumstances of each case."
57. 70 Wis. 2d 292, - N.W.2d - (1975).
58. Wis. STAT. § 268.02(1) (1973).
59. 70 Wis. 2d at 311, - N.W.2d at
60. 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).
61. Id. at 277, 182 N.W.2d at 519.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's in-
junction in the Wisconsin Rapids case where the following fac-
tors had been considered: (1) the illegal nature of the strike; (2)
the inability of the board to operate the school system as re-
quired by statute and its responsibility to the taxpayers; (3) the
inability of students to obtain public education; (4) the possi-
ble loss of state aid; (5) the inability of parents to comply with
their statutory responsibility to educate their children; and (6)
the cancellation of school activities.
While a hearing on irreparable harm will be required under
the Wisconsin Rapids decision before injunctive relief is made
available for teacher, clerical and construction employee
stikes, the court has indicated that in some instances the harm
to public safety threatened by a strike may be so immediate
and serious that a hearing would be unnecessary. Specifically,
the court stated:
While the potential for immediate and serious harm to
public health and safety is very real in a case of strikes by
policemen, firemen and to a lesser extent sanitation workers,
it is not critical where, for example, the strike is one by teach-
ers, clerical employees or construction workers and others.
We conclude in this case that immediate and serious harm
to public health and safety was not apparent and that an
injunction should issue only after a showing of irreparable
harm dependent upon the facts and circumstances as shown
in the hearing.2
Where, as in policemen and firemen's strikes the potential for
harm is apparent, injunctive relief may be more readily avail-
able.
Even before the decision in Wisconsin Rapids, Wisconsin
courts have required, in several instances, a showing of irrepar-
able harm before granting injunctive relief. In City of West
Allis v. West Allis-West Milwaukee Education Association,3 a
request for an ex parte restraining order and later a temporary
injunction against striking teachers was denied on grounds that
the city had failed to show any violence or disruption of munici-
pal affairs. In Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Kenosha
Education Assoc. ,4 the court established four grounds for tem-
62. 70 Wis. 2d at 312, __ N.W.2d at _.
63. Civil No. 386-591 (Milwaukee County Circuit Court 1971).
64. Civil No. 23-700 (Kenosha County Court 1972).
[Vol. 59
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
porary relief. After finding that (1) an illegal strike had oc-
curred, (2) that irreparable damage was resulting, (3) that the
school district had no adequate legal remedy, and (4) that the
city's request for injunctive relief had a likelihood of success,
the court granted the restraining order.
Since some Wisconsin courts have already required the
showing of irreparable harm as a basis for granting injunctive
relief from a teacher strike, the Wisconsin Rapids decision may
have a minor effect upon Wisconsin school boards and educa-
tion associations. Furthermore, since extensive negotiations
ending in mediation or fact finding have usually occurred be-
fore a public employer has sought injunctive relief, the
Wisconsin Rapids decision may not greatly change the prac-
tices of public employers. The greatest impact of the decision
would appear to lie with clerical, custodial, street and highway
employees where standards for determining irreparable harm
remain to be established.
Recently, courts in other jurisdictions have discussed the
standard of irreparable harm as it applies in teachers' strikes.
In School Dist. of Cit of Holland v. Holland Education
Assoc.," the court overturned an injunction against striking
teachers. While the court upheld the validity of the state's no-
strike law, it held:
... [I]t is insufficient merely to show that a concert of
prohibited action by public employees has taken place and
that "ipso facto" such a showing justifies injunctive relief.
We so hold because it is basically contrary to public policy
in this state to issue injunctions in labor disputes absent a
showing of violence, irreparable injury or breach of the
peace.6
The court concluded that the existence of an illegal strike and
the closing of schools as a result of that strike were not ade-
quate to justify injunctive relief. The case was remanded so
that further testimony could be taken on the need for an in-
junction and on the extent to which the school board had en-
gaged in good faith bargaining.
In cases similar to the Holland decision, courts in New
Hampshire and Rhode Island refused to uphold temporary in-
junctions without a showing of good faith bargaining or irrepar-
65. 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 506 (1968).
66. Id. -, 157 N.W.2d at 210.
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able harm. In Timberlane School District v. Timberlane Edu-
cation Assoc. , 7 the plaintiff school district had rejected re-
quests for mediation and sought injunctive relief instead. The
court observed that the association had no means for compel-
ling the school board to bargain in good faith except through
an illegal strike. The court concluded that the issuance of auto-
matic injunctions would be detrimental to the smooth opera-
tion of collective bargaining since it would reduce the pressures
upon the board to bargain in good faith except through an
illegal strike. In School Committee of the Town of Westerly v.
Westerly Teaching Assoc.," the Rhode Island court required
proof of irreparable harm before allowing injunctive relief. The
mere fact that public schools were closed was held to be inade-
quate to meet this standard. As in the Timberlane case, the
court was concerned that by issuing automatic injunctions, it
would become a coercive force at the bargaining table, thus
undermining the role of collective bargaining.
The Holland, Timberlane and Westerly decisions have been
criticized for placing too great a burden upon the public em-
ployer seeking injunctive relief. In State v. Delaware Educa-
tional Assoc.," the court criticized these decisions for requiring
a ruling on the employer's good faith bargaining before an in-
junction would be issued. The court stated:
It is not even generally an answer to say that the public
employer is violating the law in some respect. Although one
might imagine the case where equitable relief should be de-
nied because of some unclean action by the public employer,
the normal response to illegal activity by the public employer
should be a legal action to compel the public employee to
obey the law."0
This action might consist of a charge before the state em-
ployment relations board or a writ of mandamus. The Delaware
court found further grounds for criticism in the application of
"irreparable harm" by the courts in Holland, Timberlane and
Westerly. The court stated:
The second policy ground gleaned from the cases cited
above suggests the harm caused by a strike is not of sufficient
67. 87 LRRM 2015 (N.H. 1974).
68. 87 LRRM 2567 (R.I. 1973).
69. 87 LRRM 2721 (Del. 1974).
70. Id. at 2726.
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significance to justify judicial interference and so suggesting
the three decisions simply misunderstand the nature of irre-
parable harm. Irreparable harm does not depend on a cata-
strophe or on violence or on an epidemic. Irreparable harm
depends on interference with a legal right and should be
judged by traditional equitable principles applicable in all
cases for preliminary relief. Generally, irreparable harm ex-
ists when the injury cannot be adequately compensated in
damages. It is not necessary that the injury be beyond the
possibility of repair by money compensation, but it must be
of such a natbre that no fair and reasonable redress may be
had in a court of law and that to refuse the injunction would
be a denial of justice.71
Public employees' unions have countered requests for in-
junctive relief with a variety of statutory and constitutional
arguments. Except for the rationale accepted by Holland and
Timberlane, these arguments have been largely ineffective.
Most widespread of the statutory arguments is the argument
that "little Norris-LaGuardia 72 statutes prohibit the court
from issuing an injunction. In Wisconsin this argument was
rejected in University of Wisconsin v. The Teaching Assistants
Association, where it was held that: "Conditions imposed on
enjoining otherwise lawful activities are not helpful in deciding
the tests to be applied where the activity concerned is illegal
per se."173
The position taken by the circuit court in University of
Wisconsin v. The Teaching Assistants Association was upheld
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Wisconsin Rapids deci-
sion. 74 Relying on the weight of federal and state decisions
which permit injunctive relief for public employers, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that the State's "little Norris-
LaGuardia act" must be restricted to those situations falling
specifically within its terms. The fact that the act does not
specifically apply to public employers combined with the fact
that Wisconsin has other statutory provisions specifically appl-
icable to public employment, led the court to conclude that the
71. Id. at 2725.
72. See Wis. STAT. § 103.56 (1973) for illustration of a "little Norris-LaGuardia"
act.
73. University of Wisconsin v. The Teaching Assistants Assoc., Civil No. 130-095
(Dane County Circuit Court, 1970), 74 LRRM 2050.
74. 70 Wis. 2d 292, - N.W.2d - (1975).
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"little Norris-LaGuardia act" was not applicable to public
employment.75
Other jurisdictions have similarly limited "little Norris-
LaGuardia acts".76 The position taken by these courts is
strengthened by the precedent set in United States v. United
Mine Workers," which held that the federal Norris-LaGuardia
Act did not apply to federal employees. The Supreme Court
based its decision upon the rule that: ". . . [S]tatutes which
in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not
be applied to the sovereign without express words to that ef-
fect."" The Court reasoned that in the absence of a specific
incorporation of federal employees in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, it could not be inferred that such employees were in-
cluded.
In some jurisdictions, "little Norris-LaGuardia" statutes
have been applied to public employees. The Holland decision
discussed above gave weight to the public policy against in-
junctions established by a "little Norris-LaGuardia" act. In
Illinois it has been held that an anti-injunction statute will not
apply where a specific constitutional duty to perform is im-
posed. Thus, since the state constitution established the duty
to provide public schools, teacher strikes were enjoinable.79
Where, as in the case of hospitals and institutions, no specific
constitutional requirement is imposed upon the public em-
ployer, the anti-injunction statute has been given effect.8"
Constitutional issues have also been raised by unions seek-
ing to defeat an injunction. Foremost of these is an argument
based upon Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection
of the laws. The argument is based upon a comparison between
75. Id. at 307, - N.W.2d at _ .
76. Anderson Federation of Teachers Local 519 v. School Dist. of Anderson, 250
Wis. 550, 27 N.W.2d 875 (1947); Board of Education v. Montgomery County Education
Assoc., 67 LRRM 2745 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1968); Delaware River & Bay Authority v. Interna-
tional Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 45 N.J. 138, 211 A.2d 789 (1965);
Hansen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214, 181 N.E.2d 843 (1962); New Jersey Turn-
pike Authority v. AFSCME Local 1511, 83 N.J. Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134 (1964); Port
of Seattle v. ILWU 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958); Rankin v. Shanker, 23
N.Y.2d 111, 242 N.E.2d 802, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1968).
77. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
78. Id. at 272.
79. Board of Education v. Redding, 32 ll.2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); Allen v.
Maueurer, 6 Ill. App. 3d 633, 286 N.E.2d 135 (1972).
80. Peters v. South Chicago Community Hospital, 44 Ill. 2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375
(1969); County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Ill. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970).
[Vol. 59
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
public sector employees who can strike and private sector em-
ployees who cannot. It is argued that the distinction serves no
rational purpose and must be struck down as violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and since the strike ban is allegedly
unconstitutional, the strike itself cannot be enjoined.
This argument has recently been rejected by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Hortonville Education Assoc. v. Hortonville
Joint School Dist.' The court found several distinctions be-
tween public and private sector employees. These included the
fact that the public employer is entitled to a higher level of
devotion from its employees, that employees have opportuni-
ties to achieve their objectives through the legislative process,
and that the lack of market pressures upon the governmental
employer make it particularly vulnerable to strikes. Since the
right to strike is not constitutionally protected and is not a
fundamental right, no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
occurs so long as the distinctive treatment of public employees
is not arbitrary." Based upon the above distinctions, the court
found that the no-strike statute did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Constitutional arguments have also been raised under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under
the Thirteenth Amendment. In United Federation of Postal
Clerks v. Blount,3 the court rejected the argument that the
federal statute prohibiting strikes among federal employees
was vague and overbroad. The court held that it had broad
latitude to construe a statute in terms that would save it from
vagueness and overbreadth. A limited definition of "striking"
was adopted by the court and the union's Fourteenth Amend-
ment argument was denied. Unions have also sought to avoid
injunctions under the argument that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition on involuntary servitude invalidates state
no-strike laws. Courts have, however, drawn a distinction be-
tween a prohibition on the right to strike and a prohibition on
quitting employment. A strike prohibition has been held to
offer employees the opportunity of returning to work or resign-
81. 66 Wis. 2d 469, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975).
82. United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C., 1971),
aft'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971). See also WERB v. AASERMC, Div. 998, 257 Wis. 43, 42
N.W.2d 471 (1950).
83. United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971),
aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
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ing. In a Wisconsin case involving the private sector, it was
held that restrictions on the right to strike did not violate the
Thirteenth Amendment. The court stated that, while employ-
ees had the right to cease work, when such quitting was part
of an unlawful plan it was enjoinable.
While injunctive relief is generally available to public em-
ployers, recent cases indicate that the employers should be
prepared to present substantial evidence of irreparable harm
and of good faith bargaining. In many instances, these stan-
dards can be met. Police, fire and sanitation strikes are obvious
examples of immediate and irreparable harm. Among other
employees, mainly clerical type positions, this standard may
be more difficult to achieve. Frequently, judges are not only
requiring irreparable harm and good faith bargaining, but are
requiring both parties to attend extensive mediation sessions
before action is taken on the injunction. In such cases, injunc-
tive relief is granted only as a last alternative. Judges may also
require continued and extensive good faith bargaining as a con-
dition for maintaining the injunction. Both of these tactics
reflect the court's realization that injunctive relief will not set-
tle the dispute.
7. Temporary and Permanent Replacements
The most drastic means by which a public employer may
continue public services is through the hiring of replacements.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that a public employer
is not prohibited from hiring permanent replacement employ-
ees.86 Caution must be exercised, however, when, as part of a
replacement program, the employees with individual con-
tracts, tenure, or property interests in their positions are fired. 7
Caution must also be taken to avoid violation of Wisconsin
Statutes section 103.43,88 which provides that employment ad-
vertisements must state that a labor dispute is in progress.
The hiring of permanent replacement employees will cause
84. Pinellas County Teachers Assoc. v. Board of Public Education of Pinellas
County, 214 So. 2d 34 (Fla 1968).
85. UAW v. WERB, 250 Wis. 550, 27 N.W.2d 875 (1947). See also In re Block, 50
N.J. 494, 236 A.2d 592 (1967).
86. Hortonville Education Association v. Hortonville Joint School Dist., 66 Wis. 2d
469, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975).
87. Id.
88. Wis. STAT. § 103.43 (1973).
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the strike to become less controllable. Violence and lasting
hostility will arise. The divisions within the community which
will follow from this action may last for years.
The hiring of permanent replacement employees makes a
negotiated settlement virtually impossible. No union can agree
to a settlement which terminates the employment of its mem-
bers. The employer, on the other hand, becomes obligated to
retain the replacement employees., The only alternatives are
capitulation by the union or featherbedding by the employer.
The hiring of temporary replacements is less drastic. If the
need for services is great and it is well publicized that the
replacements are only temporary, such a plan can be success-
ful. Frequently, the most difficult problem with this tactic is
an inability to find temporary replacements. Few people will
risk the harassment of crossing picket lines unless guaranteed
long-term employment. In a few instances, temporary replace-
ments may become available. Where, as in the case of hospitals
and institutions, a strike will place friends and relatives in
immediate danger, some voluntary, unskilled aid may be avail-
able. Yet, even here, qualified replacements must be found and
trained. As in the case of supervisory staff, extra precautions
must be made in training and supervising temporary replace-
ments to avoid safety hazards.
CONCLUSION: RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
The public employer has numerous alternatives to reduce
the effects of job actions, picketing and strikes. No one alterna-
tive can be viewed as a panacea. Only after local conditions
have been thoroughly considered can some alternatives be se-
lected over others. Even then, the alternatives will not settle
the dispute. These alternatives may reduce or eliminate the
dispute's symptoms but do not resolve the basic disagreements
which give rise to the dispute. When both parties develop a
posture of mutual trust and respect, many areas of dispute are
quickly resolved. Pressure techniques applied by either side
will not provide meaningful and long range solutions to labor
problems. These problems must be settled on terms acceptable
to both sides. In the final analysis, only a negotiated settlement
can insure the continuing labor peace which should be a prime
goal of both labor and management.
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Appendix A
The following is an ordinance based upon the City of Wau-
watosa Residential Picketing Ordinance, upheld in City of
Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1970).
7.52.010 Declaration. It is hereby declared that the pro-
tection and preservation of the home is the keystone of
democratic government; that the public health and wel-
fare and the good order of the community require that
members of the community enjoy in their homes and
dwellings the feeling of well-being and tranquility, and
privacy and when absent from their homes and dwell-
ings, carry with them the sense of security inherent in
the assurance that they may return to the enjoyment of
their homes and dwellings; that the practice of picket-
ing before or about such residences and dwellings causes
emotional disturbance and distress to occupants; ob-
structs and interferes with the free use of public side-
walks and public ways of travel; that such practice has
as its object the harassing of such occupants; and with-
out resort to such practices full opportunity exists, and
under the terms and provisions of this ordinance will
continue to exist for the exercise of freedom of speech
and other constitutional rights; and that the provisions
hereinafter enacted are necessary for the public interest
to avoid the detrimental results herein set forth and are
enacted by the Common Council of the City of Wauwa-
tosa pursuant to the provisions of Section 62.11(5) of the
Wisconsin Statutes. ...
7.52.020 Picketing residence or dwelling unlawful. It is
unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or
about the residence or dwelling of any individual. Noth-
ing herein shall be deemed to prohibit (1) picketing in
any lawful manner during a labor dispute, or (2) the
holding of a meeting or assembly on any premises com-
monly used for the discussion of subjects of general pub-
lic interest.
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